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Reverse Engineering the Behaviour of Twitter Bots
Bello Shehu Bello, Reiko Heckel, Leandro Minku
Department of Informatics, University of Leicester, UK
{bsb14, reiko.heckel, leadro.minku}@le.ac.uk
Abstract—Recent research has shown significant success in
the detection of social bots. While there are tools to distinguish
automated bots from regular user accounts, information about
their strategies, biases and influence on their target audience
remains harder to obtain. To uncover such details, e.g., to
understand the role of bots in political campaigns, we address
three questions: Can we describe the behaviour of a bot (when
and how a bot takes actions) by a set of understandable rules?
How can we express bias and influence? Can we extract such
information automatically, from observations of a bot?
In this paper, we present an approach to reverse engineering
the behaviour of Twitter bots to create a visual model explaining
their actions. We use machine learning to infer a set of simple
and general rules governing the behaviour of a bot. We propose
the notion of differential sentiment analysis to provide means
of understanding the behaviour with respect to the topics on its
network in relation to both its sources of information (friends)
and its target audience (followers). Respectively, this provides
insights into their bias and the influence aimed at their target
audience.
We evaluate our approach using prototype bots we created and
selected real Twitter bots. The results show that we are successful
in correctly describing the behaviour of the bots and potentially
useful in understanding their impact.
Index Terms—Twitter bots, social network analysis, reverse
engineering, behavioral analysis, differential sentiment analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of social bots has introduced a new challenge in
social network analysis [7]. Social bots are particularly com-
mon on Twitter. They tweet, retweet and actively participate
in the formation of public opinion [12]. A recent review of
Twitter accounts by Twitter Inc. shows that about 8.5% (more
than 13.5 million) of Twitter user accounts are social bots
[20]. Social bots are automated user accounts that interact
with other users, performing a number of actions based on
predefined rules [8]. Bots can perform a legitimate task such
as delivering news, directing users to useful links and updating
news feeds. However, bots are widely used to spread spam,
mislead and manipulate the content of social media [8], [12].
Bots are deployed by political actors to attack their opponents
and promote political interests. In the UK referendum on
EU membership, Twitter bots were used by both sides of
the debate [12]. Bots were used in the 2016 US presidential
election to support candidates and attack their opponents by
injecting information pointing at websites with fake news [8],
[17].
Although different approaches and tools [3]–[6] were de-
veloped to detect Twitter bots, details about their behaviour
remain veiled. This leaves several questions unanswered. How
and when do they take actions? What are their targets? What
positions do they try to promote? We try to answer such
questions by reverse engineering the behaviour of social bots.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first effort to
understand the rules controlling the behaviour of Twitter Bots.
Our aim is to create a model explaining the behaviour of
the bots. Once data about a suspected bot is extracted, we
use feature selection to detect the attributes used by the bot
to make decisions, construct decision trees to infer rules. Our
novel rule-based representation simplifies and generalizes the
presentation of decision trees to provide a plausible explana-
tion of the bot’s behaviour.
We use topic modelling based on LDA [2] to discover the
topics of interest to a bot. For each topic, we analyse the
sentiment of the tweets produce by the bot and that of the users
on its network. We introduce differential sentiment analysis
to understand the bot’s attitude as compared to that of its
users, both in relation to its sources of information (friends,
the users followed by the bot) and its target audience (the bot’s
followers).
Our work on reverse engineering Twitter bots will help to
identify their strategies, biases and influence on their target
audience. This may help to detect issues such as bots calling
for extremist or violent action, or spreading misinformation.
We used prototype bots we created and selected real Twitter
bots to evaluate our approach. We conducted a series of
experiments to test how well the approach will scale on
different bots with different behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II covers related work on detection of Twitter bots. Section III
describes the details of our approach. Section IV presents our
experimental results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper
and states our future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Most relevant to our work is research on the detection
of social bots, concerned with identification and separation
of bots from humans with little or no information about
their behaviour. Our work extends the identification of bots
by recovering behavioural information. This will allow the
analysis of their purpose and influence on social media.
In recent years, social bots have increasingly become more
sophisticated, challenging existing detection strategies. A num-
ber of detection methods were introduced. The survey [8]
classified bot detection systems as graph-based, crowdsourcing
and feature based. While the graph-based approach focuses
on the structure of the social graph to identify bots, feature-
based detection systems focus on behavioural patterns to learn
signatures of human-like and bot-like behaviour. BotOrNot,
now Botometer1 is one of the feature-based detection systems
made publically available to check the presence of social
bots on Twitter accounts [5]. It classifies Twitter accounts
as bots by selecting and analyzing features that differentiate
between human and automated users. The features are grouped
into six main classes: retweet, user mention and hashtag co-
occurrences are network features used to compute statistical
information such as degree distribution, centrality measures
and cluster coefficients. The number of followers and posts are
classified as friends features which provide statistics relative to
the account. Tweet rate and inter-tweet time distribution are
important factors to identify automated accounts. Botometer
uses these as temporal features to capture the timing pattern
of content generation and consumption. Other features used
by Botometer are user, content and sentiment [5]. Currently,
Botometer displays a percentage of whether a given Twitter
account is likely to be a bot.
In 2015 DARPA organized the Twitter Bot Detection Chal-
lenge to developed techniques for early detection of bots [20].
The features used by most participants to identify bots were
similar to those used in Botometer. They concluded that, as
Twitter bots are becoming more sophisticated there is a strong
need for efficient ways to categorize them.
Research [9] makes an effort to analyse social bot infiltration
strategies in Twitter. Despite the fact that Twitter is trying to
block bots, their work shows that there are many ways Twitter
bots can be created in large numbers and live a long life
without being shut down. They created 120 social bot accounts
with different characteristics and strategies to investigate the
extent to which the bots infiltrate the Twitter network. Their
results show that even social bots with simple automated
mechanisms are able to infiltrate Twitter successfully. They
claim that if social bots are created in large numbers, they can
endanger our politics by disseminating false information with
significant impact on public opinion.
Recently [10] proposed a framework for bot analysis named
Stweeler. Although they intend to study the impact of bots
on online social networks, they do not discover the rules
controlling bots, nor details about their targets and policies.
The current version of Stweeler available at github2 serves as
a platform for the collection of tweets, creating honeypots and
classification of Twitter account as human or bots. Stweeler
uses Bayesian text classification with ranking algorithms to
detect spam in tweets and rank the credibility of information
disseminated by a bot.
In our work, we propose the reverse engineering of Twitter
bots as a way to discover rules and understand their behaviour
in much greater detail.
III. METHODOLOGY
Twitter bots tweet, retweet, reply and send direct messages.
They also undo their actions. We are specifically interested in
1https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
2https://github.com/zafargilani/stcs
social Twitter bots that interact with the public for marketing,
political campaigns or volunteering initiatives. Bots that tweet
words from a dictionary, correct spelling or report changes in
Wikipedia are not the focus of our research. Hence, we define
a social Twitter bot as an automated user account that spreads
information and interacts with other users. Our first selection
of social Twitter bots comes from a list published by [1], [19].
These are bots used during the 2016 US presidential election
and the UK Brexit campaigns.
The wide availability of services for automating Twitter
accounts without writing code contributes to the large number
of automated accounts. We analyzed the services for creating
Twitter bots, looking at their service descriptions and creating
sample bots. The services analyzed includes labnol3, botlibre4,
jetbots5, cheapbotsdonequick6 and botize7. While this gives
us an idea about the possible behaviour of simple bots, more
sophisticated bots can be created in a programmatic way. To
analyse the latter we take two approaches: Firstly, we study
the Twitter API which provides programmatic access to public
tweets. This is to understand the data available to bots and
possible patterns which they could use to take actions. In
short, Twitter bots use the Twitter search API to find tweets or
users, e.g., tweets with a hashtag #Brexit or tweets from user
@realDonaldTrump with retweet count of at least 100. Details
about these searches can be found in the Twitter search API
page8 9.
Secondly, we selected real social Twitter bots and analyzed
them, mining data from their accounts for patterns includ-
ing the relationship between actions performed and sets of
attributes of tweets or users. We identify such patterns by
extracting attribute values from action occurrences, to learn
when and how certain attribute values trigger an action. To
represent the resulting patterns visually, we define a general
notion of rule for Twitter bots.
A Twitter bot rule is composed of a pattern P and the
invocation of an operation. A graphical representation of a
rule is sketched in Fig. 1. The pattern of a rule can be based
on attributes of tweets and/or users, but can also be more
complicated, e.g., considering the follower relation.
A. Data Collection
We built a crawler that mines data from bots via the Twitter
API. For each action, such as reply and retweet, we capture
attribute values of the original tweets and the users who created
them10 11. We extract both graph-based and content features.
3https://www.labnol.org/internet/write-twitter-bot/27902/
4https://www.botlibre.com/forum-post?id=5015
5http://www.jetbots.com/twitter/account-creator-bot-2/
6https://cheapbotsdonequick.com/
7https://botize.com/
8https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-advanced-search
9https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/rules-and-
filtering/overview/standard-operators.html
10https://dev.twitter.com/overview/api/tweets
11https://dev.twitter.com/overview/api/users
Fig. 1: A template of Twitter bot rule
B. Data Pre-processing
Once data about a suspected bot is extracted, we use the
Natural Language Tool Kit (NLTK)12 to pre-process the data,
tokenize text, remove stop and stem words. We also expand
shortened URLs and extract their top level domain.
C. Differential Sentiment Analysis
We introduce the notion of differential sentiment analysis to
understand the behaviour of a bot in relation to the users on its
network. We distinguish two forms of differential sentiment,
bias and influence. For each topic, we define the bot’s bias
as the difference in sentiment between the tweets produced by
the bot and the tweets on this topic issued by the bot’s friends,
i.e., the users the bot is following. The difference in sentiment
between the tweets produced by the bot and those of its own
followers defines the bot’s influence.
Moreover, we consider the evolution of sentiment over time
to detect changes in bias and influence. Recording the bots
sentiments for specified time periods, we slice the set of
tweets based on the given intervals and compute the average
sentiment of each topic. If there are not enough tweets in
a given interval, we double the length of this interval. The
average sentiment of the bot’s followers and friends on the
relevant topics are computed for the same time spans.
We use a topic model to compute the set of topics in
the tweets. The topic model is based on the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation algorithm (LDA) [2] which works effectively on
tweet texts [11], [21]. For the sentiment analysis, we use the
VADER tool [13] to compute the sentiment of each tweet. This
is a rule-based tool designed for social media text. The bot’s
sentiment with respect to each topic is added as a feature for
the analysis.
D. Feature Selection
The aim is to select the most relevant features used by a bot
to make decisions. This is an important step in understanding
the behaviour. We considered the whole set of features avail-
able to Twitter bots10,11. For example, a bot may only reply
to tweets from verified accounts or with a certain number of
followers. This leads to a set of features of different types
12https://www.nltk.org/
and priorities. After having performed experiments to find the
best feature selection method for Twitter bots, we used l1-
regularized linear SVM an embedded method for the feature
selection. Three different methods were evaluated on four
different datasets, i.e., mutual information-gain, regularized
linear SVM and random forest. Their performance and accu-
racy were evaluated using four different learning algorithms,
namely IBK, naive Bayes, SVM and decision trees. We found
that using l1-regularized linear SVM leads to the most accurate
model.
E. Machine Learning
Our interest in machine learning is to provide conceptual
explanations of the relationship between the input variables
(tweet and user features) and the output variables (bot actions).
Conventional machine learning algorithms such as naive Bayes
can classify entities and provide numerical distributions among
variables, but they do not provide a conceptual description of
their relationship [14]. Decision trees are a popular method
to capture the relationship between input and output variables
but have limited representation power. They may become very
complex even for simple relationships. We propose a novel
rule-based approach for representing the same information.
F. Rule Extraction
We employ graph transformation concepts to generate rules
from decision trees for two purposes. First, general rules can
cover unseen examples and combine leaf nodes of the same
type. Second, they simplify and enhance the readability of the
model. Fig 2a shows a simple example of a decision tree of
a Twitter bot. We can translate it into a rule of the form IF
pattern THEN action. This can be represent as shown
in Fig 2b. Our representation combines the leaf nodes of the
decision tree and generalizes the set of users to cover unseen
username.
G. Visualization
We introduce a new visualization that separates the high-
level representation of rules from the data. For each action,
our visualization produces a graph representation of a set of
rules {r1, r2, . . . , rn} formed from the set of attributes used
by the bot. A tabular representation of values associated with
nominal attributes supplies possible data values. The tabular
representation is colour-coded based on sentiment. The family
of green colours represents positive sentiment and that of
red indicates negative sentiment. The values are sorted in
descending order of their distribution in the data, but we intend
not to include any numerical representation of their distribution
because it is independent of the behaviour of the bot. Fig 7
shows an example of our visualization.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The aim of our experiments is to test our approach for the
extraction of rules from Twitter bots. We consider different
bots, including prototype bots we created and real Twitter bots
that actively engage with real users, to validate the result of
the rule extraction and sentiment analysis.
(a) A textual representation of a simple decision tree for Twitter Bot
(b) A representation of the decision tree in Fig. 2a using the notion of
our general rule for Twitter Bots
Fig. 2: Rule extraction
For the first experiments, we created prototype Twitter bots.
We allowed each bot to run for three weeks and then crawled
its data, including all the available features. The idea of these
experiments is to challenge our feature selection method to
select the smallest relevant subset in a large set of features
such that the rule extraction process is able to extract accurate
rules governing the bot’s behaviour.
In the second experiment, we selected real Twitter bots suc-
cessful in attracting human users. These include bots that were
found to be retweeted by realDonalTrump, the verified Twitter
account of Donal Trump. We used Debot13, a system for the
detection of Twitter bots to confirm our selection. For easy
reference, we labelled the bots used in this paper as Bot1, Bot2
and Bot3. Bot1 (Don Vito14) is a Donal Trump-supporting
bot. It was detected as bot by Debot on 2nd November, 2016,
Bot2 (natespuewell15) is a Clinton-supporting bot [1]. It was
detected as a bot by Debot on 15th September 2016.
Bot3 (BritainStays16) is an account of the campaign against
Brexit. It is not detected by Debot but is detected by our
application that we build to catch automated accounts. We
build this application in order to study the behaviour of
live automated accounts. Many of the accounts that we have
detected were later detected and suspended by Twitter, in-
cluding @UKIPNFKN which we found to be connected with
13http://www.cs.unm.edu/ chavoshi/debot/check user.php
14https://twitter.com/Don Vito 08
15https://twitter.com/natespuewell
16https://twitter.com/BritainStays
@BritainStays, reacting to and propagating similar hashtags.
On analysis of BritainStays we found evidence of automation
in its dataset, see also Table I.
A. Data Collection
In each experiment, we crawled a maximum of 3,200 tweets
from each bot. These include retweets and replies. We are
interested in understanding the users and tweets attractive to
the bots. Hence for each retweet or reply we extracted the
original tweets and the users who created them. We collected
all the available features of the tweets and the users in a
table of features and observed the table to established an
initial understanding of the behaviour of the bot. Through
this observation we learned that Bot1 is retweeting from and
replying to a set of users including Donal Trump and to
tweets with keywords and hashtags including AmericaFirst,
makeAmericaGreat. We also found that Bot1 is replying to
many tweets using identical text. This is another feature for
identifying bots.
It was difficult to establish a good understanding of the
behaviour of Bot2 just by looking at its dataset, so we used our
approach to analyse its behaviour and then go back to the data
to validate our finding. This suggests that our approach is more
useful for understanding the behaviour of sophisticated bots.
We found that Bot2 is mainly disseminating tweets against
Donal Trump. Fig 3b shows the main topics used by Bot2
against Trump.
In the dataset of Bot3 (BritainStays) we found that its
tweets contain hashtags #stopBrexit, #brexitwontwork and
links to Brexit news from independent.co.uk, theguardian.com.
It also retweeted many of its own tweets, possibly due to
poor automation. It retweets tweets containing keywords or
hashtags such as Brexit, Theresa May, StopBrexit. It made few
replies, containing a well-structured text, Brexit Fact #102, 103
. . . and hashtag #FinalSay.
B. Topic Modeling and Sentiment Analysis
We computed the sentiment of tweets disseminated or
reacted to by the bots with intensity between -1 and +1.
We added the sentiment levels to the features used for rule
learning. We use LDA to compute the set of topics for which
the bot is positive, negative or neutral. This allows the model
to capture the main topics of interest to the bot. We compute
differential sentiments to provide means of understanding the
behaviour of a bot in relation to the users on its network.
Fig. 3a and 3b show the resulting differential sentiments
of bots 1 and 2. Bot1 is biased opposite to its friends with
regards to HillaryClinton and AmericaFirst. It is promoting
tweets which are negative about Hillary Clinton while users
on its network are generally positive. This is seen as a clear
sign of bias, and can also serve as a strategy to convert users,
trying to change their opinion. Bot2 is biased opposite to its
friends with regards only to MAGA (Make America Greater
Again) but shares their opinion on other topics. Looking at
the results of the two bots, Bot1 engages in both positive
and negative campaigning, while Bot2 is mainly negative. In
(a) Bot1 opposes its friends w.r.t. to Hillary Clinton, America First (b) Bot2 opposes its friends w.r.t. MAGA, but agrees on other topics
Fig. 3: Bias differential sentiment
(a) Bot1 shares opinions of its followers on all topics (b) Bot1’s influence differential sentiment over time
(c) Bot1’s follower’s absolute sentiment over time on Hillary
Clinton (d) Bot1’s follower’s absolute sentiment over time on MAGA
Fig. 4: Bot1’s influence, over time differential sentiment
particular, while Bot1 is promoting tags from Donald Trump,
it is also campaigning against Hillary Clinton. Bot2 is mainly
against Donal Trump without specifically promoting content
with regards to Hillary. In addition to detecting bias, we use
differential sentiment analysis to study the intended influence
of the bots. The majority of followers of Bot1 and 2 have the
same opinion as the bots on all topics. Fig. 4a shows this for
Bot1. Even if they agree, we notice that Bot1 is more strongly
against Hillary Clinton and supports MAGA. The followers
promote the tag AmeracaFirst more than the bot. Differential
sentiment over time (DSO) provides more insights into how
the relationship between a bot and its followers evolve. Fig. 4b
shows Bot1’s influence differential sentiment over time.
Influence differential sentiment over time (IDSO) tells us
the influence of a bot on the opinion of a network. Given the
overall polarity of a bot’s differential sentiment (DS), any point
that is opposite to that polarity on IDS over time means the bot
may have had little impact on the network with respect to that
opinion at that time. For example, Fig. 4a shows that Bot1 is
negative toward Hillary Clinton but if we look at its IDS over
time in Fig. 4b, we notice that in week 2 (25-01-2018) and
the second to the last week of the analysis (05-04-2018), the
DS turns out positive. Hence Bot1 seems to have no influence
against Hillary Clinton in these weeks. If we look at week 9
(15-03-2018) we notice that it is a period where Bot1 could
have made a significant impact. IDS over time helps us to
identify periods where a bot could have had an impact on a
network, however since there are many other factors, we only
observe correlations, not causal links. The absolute sentiment
over time simplifies the understanding of DSO over time.
Fig. 4c shows Bot1’s followers absolute sentiment over time
on Hillary Clinton. We can see that in the second to last week
(05-04-2018, week 12) the bot is less negative against Hillary
Clinton then its followers. This is a simple explanation of why
the IDS over time shows up positive in that week, to which
the bot has contribute less. Moreover, the absolute sentiment
over time provides a view of how the sentiment of a bot and
its followers change independently. Fig. 4d provides a view
of how Bot1 dominated the network with tweets supporting
MAGA more strongly than its followers.
C. Feature Selection
After pre-processing the data, vectorization of the remaining
tweet text into bi-grams and coding the data ready for machine
learning, Bot1 has 814 features Bot2 has 721 and Bot3 has
701. We used regularized l1 linear SVM as a feature selection
method to reduce the number of features for Bot1, 2 and Bot3
to 427, 291 and 84 respectively.
D. Rule Learning
We implemented rule learning based on scikit-learn [15],
an open source machine learning tool supported by Google
and INRIA. We treated our learning process as a binary
classification problem, where in each case we either learn
rules for one action (as opposed to any of the others), or
between two actions. We use grid search to cover a wide range
of hyperparameters to find optimal choices. They include the
maximal depth of a tree, minimal number of samples per split
and leaf, the penalty parameter C of the Linear SVM and class
weight. We used 5 fold, 10 repeats stratified cross-validation.
We used a roc auc score as our scoring parameter. This
optimizes rule learning to best separate the action regarded
as the positive choice from others regarded as negatives.
E. Rule Extraction
We use a decision tree classifier to build decision trees
based on the result of the feature selection process [16].
Fig 5 shows a representation of the decision tree generated
from Bot1 before rule extraction. The figure indicates the
limited representation power of decision trees. Looking at the
visualization in Fig. 6, our approach simplifies and generalizes
the decision tree using a simple but effective rule-based
representation derived as follows.
First, we traverse the tree. From the root, we follow each
branch and collect the set of decisions leading to each leaf
node (class) in a rule instance. Then we group rule instances
according to classes and remove redundant cases. For each
class, we look at its set of rule instances and remove those
that are already covered by other rules with a larger number
of examples.
Fig. 6 visualizes the retweet behaviour of the bot. It cov-
ers unseen examples by separating structural features from
attribute values. The representation includes lists of users,
keywords or hashtags that are part of the rules, but were not
captured in the sample data.
Rule 1 says that the bot retweets tweets containing a set
of keywords with favorite count at least five. The keywords
are listed in an attribute table which is colour-coded based
on sentiment. Keywords such as Travel ban, Ties Russian
are coloured orange because the tweets are negative while
AmericaFirst is green because tweets associated with it have
positive sentiment.
Rule 2 states that the bot retweets tweets containing partic-
ular hashtags that have been retweeted at least 10 times.
Rule 3 specifies that the bot retweets tweets created by
a set of users including realDonalTrump and the bot itself
(Don Vito 08). This is another feature identifying bots, which
retweet many of their own tweets due to automation.
Fig. 7 represents the reply behaviour of Bot1 using our
approach. There are three patterns which trigger the bot’s
reply. First, tweets that contain specific keywords; second,
tweets with user mentions realDonalTrump; third, tweets from
certain users. The table below each rule provides details about
the attribute values associated with the rule. The separation
of rules from attribute values simplifies and generalizes the
presentation.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate our approach in two ways: qualitatively, to
check how well the model reflects the observed behaviour of
the bots and quantitatively, to validate performance on unseen
data.
Fig. 5: Decision tree generated from Bot1. Blue nodes represent
decisions leading to retweet, orange nodes indicate replies.
Fig. 6: Retweet rules for Bot1 generated from the decision tree in
Fig. 5.
A. Qualitative
We assess the quality of the rules produced using the
proposed approach. That means to assess the extent to which
the results match our observations of the actual behaviour
of real bots or the rules controlling our prototype bots. The
prototype bots provide the first ground truth, as we are aware
of the actual behaviour of these bots. We found that our
approach has successfully recovered the rules. For the real
bots, the behaviour observed via the dataset form the ground
truth. We found that our approach recovers details that match
the observed behaviour. It also captures additional information
Fig. 7: Reply rules for Bot1.
that may be difficult to find through human observation. It
can be seen that the retweet rule for Bot1 shown in Fig. 6
matches our initial observation that the bot retweets tweets
that contain a specific keyword or hashtags related to Donald
Trump. In addition, it captures the relationship between the
keyword and the tweet’s favourite count, hashtags and tweet’s
retweet count. Although we have not noticed this during the
observation, the bot uses this as a strategy to select the most
important tweets. Differential sentiment analysis sheds more
light on the interests and target of the bots.
B. Quantitative
To evaluate the results in the case of real bots, we use
standard machine learning techniques. We gather separate
independent test data to check how well the model from
which we generate the rules will perform on unseen data. For
Bot1 and Bot2 the training data consists of 2,767 and 1,792
tweets, while the test data comprises 2,908 and 927 tweets
respectively. In the case of our prototype bots, we explore
different cases, such as limited data and class imbalance. Our
aim is that the approach should capture patterns of behaviour
within smaller representative examples. We varied the size of
training vs test data, using positive and negative examples to
check the quality of the decision trees generated. The two
prototype bots have training date sizes of 604 and 342 tweets,
test data sizes of 339 and 388. The prototype bots are called
Helpdesk and CSInfo news. The results are presented in Table
I based on measures commonly used in machine learning and
information retrieval, i.e., precision, recall and area under the
receiver operating characteristic curve (roc auc score). While
precision measures the exactness of the model, recall informs
us about completeness. They are formally defined as Precision
= TP/(TP+FP) and Recall = TP/ (TP+FN).
The roc auc score is the area under the curve of the true
positive rate (recall) plotted against the false positive rate
(FPR). The FPR is defined as FPR = FP/(FP+TN).
With regards to the classification of a bot’s action as retweet
or notRetweet we define the above norms as
• True positive (TP) = number of retweets that are correctly
classified as retweets.
• True negative (TN) = number of notRetweets that are
classified as notRetweets.
• False positive (FP) = number of notRetweets that are
classified as retweets.
• False negative (FN) = number of retweets that are clas-
sified as notRetweets.
The roc auc score is one of the most popular measures
to evaluate robustness of a classifier. Using retweet as an
example, this is the probability that the classifier will judge
a randomly chosen retweet action as retweet rather than a
randomly chosen notRetweet as retweet. This is important in
rule learning, as we want to avoid false rules while aiming
to recover as many correct rules as possible. A roc auc score
of 0.5 is considered poor while 1.0 is excellent. In predictive
studies of psychology, law and human behavior, roc auc score
of 0.70 or higher is considered strong [18]. In that sense, the
results shown in Table I show that the models from which we
generated the rules are good enough, the least roc auc score
value of natespuewell being 0.70. We noticed that some of
the topics in the training data are not in the test data, but the
overall behaviour does not change. This is the advantage of our
rule representation. The rules will remain the same, only the
tabular values will change. We achieved roc auc score of 0.95
and 0.98 in the Helpdesk and BritainStays datasets because of
the strong pattern of the test data in the training data. This
shows a strong predictive power of the models.
TABLE I: The performance result of the model on an unseen data
Data set Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure AUC Score
Helpdesk 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
CSInfo news 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.82
Don Vito 08 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.75
natespuewell 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.70
BritainStays 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
It is important to note that bots behaviour is mainly event-
specific. It may change over time due to shifts from one event
to another. Therefore, unlike other machine learning problems,
having more training data will not always lead to a good
predictive model. We intent to use incremental learning to
detect changes in the behaviour to allow our approach to report
different rules for different behaviour.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented an approach towards reverse
engineering of Twitter bots. We defined a visual format for
rules to represent their behaviour and discussed the experi-
ments used to test our approach. Our visualization simplifies
and generalizes the representation of bots’ behaviour and helps
to arrive at a plausible explanation.
We introduced differential sentiment analysis to provide
means of understanding the behaviour of a bot in relation to
its friends and followers. We introduced influence differential
sentiment analysis over time (IDSO). While [12] find it
difficult to ascertain the influence of bots on its followers
due to other external factors associated with the followers, our
IDSO can indicate periods where such influence could have
happened. The score of the differential sentiment can be used
in identifying bots that have a higher chance of making an
impact. The absolute mean sentiment over time can be used
to track and understand the response of a bot to an external
event.
We are working towards the full automation of the process
for extraction and representation of rules. Based on such
automation we would like to study how a bot’s rules changes
over time, to detect and interpret such changes.
More generally we are looking forward to building a web-
based tool for reverse engineering and analysis of Twitter bots.
This will allow the extraction and representation of rules from
online data as well as an analysis of their differential senti-
ment. The tool will also enable us to evaluate our approach
and representations in a wider context.
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